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AN ANALYSIS OF VERTICAL LIFT PLATFORMS IN SUPPORT 
OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF 
OPERATIONS  
ABSTRACT 
 The purpose of this research was to examine how the capabilities of the various 
vertical lift platforms, coupled with their unit cost, can be modeled and optimized to 
inform future decisions when tasking theater assets to assist in humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. A multi-criteria analysis was used to compare 
alternatives across key performance measures, such as search and rescue (SAR) 
capability, load capacity, range determination, and crew performance limitations. 
Additionally, we gave operational commanders a realistic assessment of daily capacity 
and cost, as well as the limitations thereof, through Monte Carlo risk simulation. Results 
from our models provided both an optimal vertical lift aircraft mix and scalable results in 
terms of daily pounds of goods delivered. 
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In early 2011, I (Commander Chirgwin, a lieutenant at the time) was enjoying 
liberty in Hong Kong while on my third deployment aboard the aircraft carrier USS Ronald 
Reagan (CVN-76). All the local news outlets were reporting an earthquake off the coast of 
Japan and the resultant tsunami that followed. The tidal surge from the wave was being 
shown as well. The phone rang in my hotel room; it was my department head. We briefly 
discussed the reports of devastation in Japan, and our conversation concluded with a 
mandatory recall to the ship for immediate underway. 
In the early afternoon on March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake 
occurred 130 kilometers off the shore of Sendai, on the eastern coast of 
Honshu Island, Japan. Within less than an hour, tsunami waves measuring 
up to 40 meters high crashed almost six miles inland, inundating 561 square 
kilometers. With a population of 14.8 million people, the prefectures along 
the northeastern coast were the worst affected, with 129,500 houses 
destroyed and 265,324 severely damaged by the earthquake, tsunami, or 
ensuing fires. (Moroney et al., 2013, p. 85) 
The first few days of relief support were chaotic. The CVN had transited the Pacific 
with such speed that we left most of the carrier strike group behind. In addition, it would 
be a few days before the C-2 Greyhound carrier onboard delivery aircraft could acquire 
relief goods. The consumable supplies that were initially delivered to the disaster-stricken 
populace were from the reserve stores held on our ship. Warm clothing and blankets were 
needed as well, due to the cold temperatures that time of year. Many sailors donated 
personal items such as clothing and blankets to the relief effort. Damage to the 
infrastructure caused by the tidal surge was so extensive that all roads and lines of 
communication were completely wiped out, which, though a problem for ground 
transportation vehicles, was a scenario that helicopters are uniquely designed to overcome. 
This is due in large part to a helicopter’s ability to take off and land vertically in small and, 
in some cases, unprepared areas such as grass fields. Additionally, there were no organic 
operational airfields in our assigned relief area, so the CVN acted as the logistics hub for 
supply distribution. The first days of flights were as much about finding the pockets of 
isolated dispersed people as they were about re-supply. Once we identified a group of 
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people, we would land the aircraft in a parking lot or nearby field and unload everything 
we had. We used the unloading time to communicate via geographic maps and “pointy 
talkies” (cards depicting food, water, shelter, etc.) to identify the location of any other 
stranded civilians At the end of the day, we turned in the information on that day’s relief 
effort to the intelligence personnel within the carrier intelligence center (CVIC). CVIC in 
turn started to build a database, annotating location and quantity supply drops, in addition 
to systematically labeling the landing zones (LZs).  
The meltdown of the Fukushima nuclear plant presented another complication 
because it required a standoff for the CVN due to concerns about radiological exposure. 
The helicopter radios operate through line of sight (LOS), and because of this standoff, the 
curvature of the earth and altitude at which helicopters operated made communications 
challenging. The airwing responded by launching fixed wing aircraft, which was beneficial 
for two reasons. The fixed wing aircraft were able to identify additional isolated 
communities and function as a communication relay between helicopters and the ship. The 
E-2C Hawkeye was critical in providing coordination and communication between all air 
and surface assets. Once airborne, we would contact the E-2C and receive our relief tasking 
and LZ assignment. After 10 days of relief work, the CVN was directed back to original 
deployment tasking, but the relief effort in Japan continued well beyond that. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) literature emphasizes the core 
challenge of disaster uncertainty with regards to planning, costs, and operations. These 
challenges present the Navy’s vertical lift asset as a uniquely capable, but also expensive, 
tool in HA/DR. Historically, HA/DR has used linear programs to analyze asset mixes and 
logistics solutions for relief operations. We use linear programming in particular to address 
a gap in the literature, specifically in determining the optimal use of vertical lift assets and 
in conducting a capacity (total pounds of supplies) risk assessment. This capacity risk 
assessment will afford the decision-maker access to delivery performance metrics given a 
selected mix of vertical lift assets and disaster parameters. A real-time, input-reliant, and 
user-friendly mathematical model will allow HA/DR decision-makers the ability to utilize 
vertical lift assets cost-efficiently and effectively. 
A. CHALLENGES 
HA/DR solutions must first consider its formidable challenge clearly outlined in 
the literature, namely the unpredictability of a disaster’s origin and magnitude and the 
subsequent difficulties with coordinating a response. The speed and magnitude of each 
disaster requires different operational responses, as shown in Figure 1. Prepositioning of 
disaster relief resources is highly beneficial for slow-onset disasters, but significantly less 
useful or feasible for disasters of a sudden nature. Sudden-onset disasters pose an additional 
challenge for budgeting, as designated relief funding for the Navy’s HA/DR operations 
lags the relief efforts and instead bleeds into the Navy’s Operations and Maintenance 
(O&M) budget. With disaster relief’s unique challenges of preparation, demand, and costs, 
existing HA/DR literature identifies vertical lift capabilities as particularly useful assets. 
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Figure 1. Classification of Disasters. Source: Apte (2009). 
Humanitarian operations in response to disasters are extremely dynamic and 
complex systems. The complexity of natural disasters is due to their inherent 
unpredictability, short response timeline, and unpredictable demand signal. The United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has implied, though 
not formally stated, that the first 72 hours of a disaster are the most critical when it comes 
to saving lives by employing relief efforts. Many state and federal relief organizations 
agree and tailor disaster preparedness kits to a 72-hour timeline. Immediate response is 
needed in order to save human lives and reduce suffering. Elleman (2007) illustrated the 
desperation of victims of the 2004 Indonesian tsunami, stating that by the 5th and 6th days, 
victims would rush airborne helicopters to receive supplies.  
Apte and Yoho (2018) determined that in addition to decision-makers inability to 
predict demand for future disasters, post-hoc analysis of past disasters is often inadequate. 
Further compounding the issues of demand is the surge capacity (supplies and services) 
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associated with disasters. Apte (2009) categorized disasters in a framework that compares 
location against time (see Figure 1). 
Building upon this framework, Ures (2011) concluded that all disasters will 
experience a sharp demand increase or “capacity spike,” but the speed of onset sets these 
disasters apart. Disasters that display a slow onset, such as a tropical storm that develops 
into a hurricane, can be mitigated and prepared for through asset prepositioning or 
proactive deployment (Yoho & Apte, 2014). Sudden onset disasters such as the Haitian 
earthquake in 2010, however, will demonstrate an inability for decision-makers to properly 
prepare, thus requiring surge capacity external to the disaster. The primary means of 
transportation to satisfy capacity in a sudden-onset disaster will be via vertical lift (Moffat, 
2014; Ures, 2011). 
Total HA/DR costs can be problematic to decision-makers as we look to the future 
and are at odds with the desired 72-hour response timeline. Herbert et al. (2012) detailed 
some of the regulatory bureaucracy associated with HA/DR support. Their research 
indicates that the Navy will systematically preposition resources prior to the official orders 
from the secretary of defense (SECDEF) to expedite response time. Prepositioning, while 
operationally and logistically sound, tends to mask some expenses because the Overseas 
Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) grant of funds lags the execution of this 
process. As a result, misalignment costs are absorbed into the Navy’s Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M) budget. In evaluating historical disasters, Navy and Marine vertical 
lift aviation platforms are the most essential asset to HA/DR operations. 
B. SOLUTION: VERTICAL LIFT  
Vertical lift platforms such as helicopters are uniquely tailored for the HA/DR 
contingencies and well suited for the resultant environment. Helicopters offer the ability to 
render services and supplies to isolated personnel and provide search and rescue (SAR) to 
disaster-stricken populations. Consequently, vessels that carry vertical lift assets are the 
best suited ships for HA/DR operations. Flight operations, however, constitute a sizeable 
portion of relief costs, so it is important to use them efficiently. 
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Greenfield and Ingram (2011) and Moffat (2014) identified HA/DR as a growing 
mission within the Department of Defense and an evolving core competency in the Navy. 
The authors determined which ships in the Navy provide the most capability to HA/DR 
and, perhaps equally as important, which ships do not. In both research papers, the authors 
concluded that ships that possess vertical lift assets such as helicopters are overwhelmingly 
more suited to conduct HA/DR missions. Moffat (2014) utilized a capability scoring 
system to rank ship types in terms of overall capability to support HA/DR. He concluded 
that the landing helicopter assault (LHA), landing helicopter dock (LHD), and aircraft 
carrier (CVN) provided the most capability, mostly due to organic helicopter assets. Moffat 
also concluded that the LHD, landing platform/dock (LPD), and LHA were the most cost-
effective platforms for HA/DR. Apte and Yoho (2018) validated these findings, 
highlighting that ships with the capabilities to embark helicopters are far more effective in 
the execution of HA/DR missions. Their research further concluded that in the past, the 
Navy has deployed ships such as minesweepers and vessels lacking vertical lift capabilities. 
In one such instance, the USS Hopper (DDG 70) deployed to Bangladesh in response to 
Cyclone Sidr but lacked both a helicopter detachment to provide vertical lift support and a 
shallow enough draft to employ small boat teams. The USS Hopper, although deployed 
with good intentions, was completely ineffective at providing relief support. 
Ures (2011) evaluated three separate disasters: the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 
2010 Haiti earthquake, and the 2010 Pakistani floods. The researcher identified individual 
cost drivers within these specific disasters and the associated sources of cost to inform 
budgetary decisions about future disasters. Ures concluded that the capabilities provided 
by vertical lift aircraft are both expensive and the most demanded. The author 
recommended that ship selection should be tailored toward vessels with large flight decks 
because they can better support helicopter flight operations. Herbert et al. (2012) seemed 
to confirm the same overall cost profile in their evaluation of the tsunami in Japan. Their 
research confirmed that flight operations are the primary costs drivers in HA/DR, 
attributing to 68% of the total reimbursable costs to those operations. It is important to note 
that although both Ures and Herbert et al.identified flight operations as the costliest 
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capability, they disagreed on type of aircraft (fixed vs. rotary). We attribute these differing 
conclusions to the variability inherent to disasters and in U.S. response. 
C. MODELING 
Given the wide range of naval vessels available for HA/DR support, logistical 
planners must maximize the capabilities offered across platforms. Linear programming 
models are a common tool utilized within the literature to optimize HA/DR operational 
performance. Although linear programs have been used for determining optimal ship vessel 
compositions and logistics planning, our research uses linear programs to find the ideal 
mix of vertical lift assets. This vertical asset mix solution is not only useful itself to HA/DR 
planners but is also useful within our research to conduct a risk analysis of relief 
performance. 
A portion of the HA/DR literature is devoted to discovering the optimal assets, 
planning, and schedules to respond to future disasters. Apte and Yoho (2017a, 2017b, 
2018) classified the capabilities offered by naval surface vessels and employed a linear 
programming model to determine the optimal asset mix for HA/DR missions. Budget cuts 
and constrained HA/DR budgets motivated Apte and Yoho’s (2017a, 2018) research, as 
the optimal mix accounts for a minimized budget. Clementson and Fisher (2011) compared 
the utilities of helicopter mixes that exist within predetermined groupings (e.g., carrier 
strike group, amphibious readiness group, etc.), although no attempt at modeling was 
completed. We, too, seek an optimal assortment of assets using modeling, but specifically 
for vertical lift platforms, as this is not assessed within the literature. Minimizing the costs 
of vertical lift operations is likewise considered through the flight costs of operations.  
In addition to using mathematical modeling as a method to determine the most 
valuable platforms for HA/DR missions, some of the literature has focused on the delivery 
of assets to relief areas and the transportation of affected populations to safer areas. Apte 
and Salmeron (2009), Mogilevsky (2013), and Scott and Watson (2018) all utilized 
optimization modeling to focus their research on the vertical air lift delivery of resources 
to disaster-stricken areas. Their research pertains to heavy resupply of relief resources 
destined for distribution hubs. Our research focuses on the movement of aid from these 
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distribution centers to the actual recipient, as vertical lift assets represent the most valuable 
delivery tool when transportation infrastructure is rendered unusable. Much of the 
logistical challenges surrounding aid delivery reside in the planning of last-mile 
distribution routes of helicopters. Ozdamar (2011) and Xavier et al. (2011) utilized a linear 
program to model the helicopter deliveries optimized for minimum transit time in a 
hypothetical HA/DR scenario. Ozdamar’s research concluded that for simpler academic 
purposes, their proposed linear program offers quick solutions. However, due to 
computational limits, larger transportation scenarios will require a heuristic approach. 
Though our research focuses its use of modeling on the optimal mix of vertical lift assets, 
we build upon Ozdamar’s approach by employing probability distributions to analyze a 
forecast of HA/DR delivery performance. 
Given the abundant research with respect to optimization surrounding HA/DR, 
there lies a need for decision-makers and planners to assess the projected performance of 
the assets devoted to relief missions. Information regarding the efficiency and utility of 
platforms, though useful in pre-disaster planning, becomes less relevant as the actual assets 
within the disaster theater begin their disaster response. What becomes more necessary is 
an accurate forecasting system that equips decision-maker models with the ability to input 
the assets available for the relief effort and the parameters pertaining to the realized disaster 
environment. Wray (2009) acknowledged the complicated nature pertaining to Marine 
Corps helicopter scheduling and the importance of a user-friendly tool in a fast-paced, 
dynamic environment. Apte and Salmeron (2009) used a two-stage stochastic optimization 
model to guide decision-making within a budget constraint through the various stages of 
HA/DR response efforts. Still, an accurate forecasting method for vertical lift assets is 
needed. HA/DR planners need not only information on the most efficient mix of vertical 
lift assets, but also a forecasting tool that provides accurate performance and reliability 
metrics given the disaster at hand. 
D. THE GAP IN THE LITERATURE  
Our research aims to determine the optimal mix of vertical lift assets through a 
mathematical modeling capacity analysis across available HA/DR platforms. However, we 
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must also differentiate between a theoretical mix of vertical assets and the actual assets 
devoted to a relief effort since we acknowledge that the optimal solution of our model will 
not necessarily yield a practical recommendation of assets. In order to determine the actual 
performance of our recommended assets, we conduct a risk analysis to address the 
uncertainty of HA/DR logistics. Our risk analysis consists of scenario-based simulations 
to determine delivery capacity performance. The results of our risk analysis afford HA/DR 
decision-makers delivery reliability metrics given a user-selected mix of vertical lift assets 
and disaster operation parameters. 
The potential impracticality of an optimal solution prompts us to conduct a capacity 
risk assessment of supplying HA/DR demand in addition to mathematical modeling. The 
literature acknowledges that estimating the precise amount of demand for disaster-affected 
areas is indeed one of the most significant challenges to HA/DR planning (Apte, 2009). 
Our capacity risk analysis acknowledges that in practice, true demand of relief recipients 
will virtually always overshadow the amount supplied, particularly in the first 72 hours of 
relief missions. The important question to ask regarding vertical lift assets’ contributions 
to HA/DR pertains to the total amount that vertical lift assets can supply within a timeframe 
of operations. 
Since relief scenarios differ both qualitatively and quantitatively from each other, 
the proper use of operational parameters carries significant weight. The scenario-based 
approach to HA/DR missions is not uncommon in the literature. Clementson and Fisher 
(2011) analyzed the use of helicopters in HA/DR missions to maximize the number of 
sorties executed by pre-determined mixes of aircraft with the lowest costs per flight hour. 
Given various scenarios and pre-set flight paths for sortie loading and delivery, Clementson 
and Fisher were able to assess the amount of supplies that could be delivered for the 
duration of the HA/DR relief mission. Our research similarly estimates an assortment of 
aircraft’s ability to accomplish the maximum number of sorties, but with the critical 
element of variability added to our design. Clementson and Fisher acknowledged their 
research purposely excluded uncertainty from their methodology. However, in our capacity 
risk analysis, we acknowledge uncertainty as the driving determinant of vertical lift relief 
performance. Within the first 72 hours of relief operations, flight routes cannot be 
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determined with certainty, as landing zone locations are subject to environmental 
conditions, competition for relief resources, and communications with the area. 
Coordinators and pilots alike must be prepared to embark to a makeshift landing zone at 
little notice.  
A responsive dispatching tool is important for vertical lift relief planning due to the 
need for expedience and the dynamic identification of landing zones. Relief must be 
delivered quickly once landing zones are identified, and aircraft may be redirected during 
HA/DR missions. The uncertainty surrounding landing zones contributes to the importance 
of an expedient and efficient means of dispatching vertical assets to complete sorties and 
calculating the projected performance of relief deliveries. Indeed, the importance of 
dispatching helicopter flights for varying mission types is widely recognized in the aviation 
community. In the realm of Marine Corps assault helicopters, Wray (2009) argued for the 
use of the Marine Assault Support Helicopter Planning Assistance Tool (MASHPAT), a 
no-cost computer program that allows logistical planners to view projected outcomes of 
mission performance. MASHPAT users can streamline their scheduling work by inputting 
desired parameters, such as load time, and outputting a proposed flight plan.  
Our risk analysis design similarly allows decision-makers to assess delivery 
reliability using a streamlined interface. Using our risk analysis simulation, the user can 
identify the delivery capacity of a selected assortment of vertical lift assets given the 
parameters of landing zone distance, loading, and refueling times. As more data can be 
gathered about the displaced population, demand requirements become clearer. Our risk 
analysis simulation can provide a real-time assessment of reliability and the projected 
performance of vertical relief efforts. Risk analysis affords decision-makers accurate 
projections of vertical lift asset performance in the early stages of disaster relief to better 
coordinate with allied relief actors. Understanding the projected performance of vertical 
lift assets assists in clearing logistical uncertainties and effectively aiding as many affected 
individuals as possible.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
The focus of our thesis work is to build a realistic set of models to understand the 
capabilities and costs associated with helicopter support during HA/DR operations. To do 
this, we built two different types of models, a linear programming model and a risk analysis 
model, utilizing Monte Carlo simulation. These models use the Microsoft Excel add-ins 
Solver and Crystal Ball, respectively. The linear programming model would determine the 
optimal number and type of aircraft to be used to either maximize capacity in terms of 
pounds of relief goods or to minimize cost. The risk analysis model is designed to indicate 
and identify the risk associated with the delivery of supplies in terms of pounds delivered. 
For example, a user could determine with 80% certainty the amount of capacity that could 
be counted on per day given a specific aircraft type and quantity. In this chapter, we discuss 
the data collected, the costs associated, and the modeling process.  
Figure 2 illustrates graphically the real-world scenario we are modeling in our 
disaster response. The basic premise is that a vertical lift asset such as a helicopter would 
onload fuel and supplies onboard an afloat staging base such as an aircraft carrier or an 
amphibious assault ship such as an LHD/LHA because of their utility in HA/DR (Apte & 
Yoho, 2018). For the purpose of our model, these ship types act as supply points or hubs 
that are capable of continuous resupply. The vertical lift assets onboard would load supplies 
and then deliver them to their assigned landing zone. The helicopters would then return to 
the hub, take on more supplies and fuel, and make additional trips until pilots reach their 




Original map retrieved from Google Earth, FEB 2012. 
Original LHD image retrieved from Google, MAR 2020. 
Figure 2. Notional HA/DR Operation 
A. DATA 
The data that supported our research model came in two parts for our analysis. The 
first part was variable cost data (fuel), which was provided by the organization Naval 
Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC). The second 
portion of the data is Hours of flight time = (Distance to LZ [nautical mile 
(NM)])/(Maximum Range Airspeed (NM/hr). These technical manuals are utilized to 
define certain aircraft capabilities such as capacity limitations, transit airspeeds, and the 
reliability of SAR. Ultimately, to make similar comparisons across multiple aviation 
platforms, we utilized variable costs versus performance capabilities to derive an optimal 
solution of aircraft employment. The aircraft chosen for evaluation were vertical lift assets, 
which includes both helicopters and Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) aircraft such 
as the V-22 Osprey. We did not include helicopters suited for attack-type roles such as the 
AH-1 Cobra because of their limited ability to carry supplies for HA/DR. Further, we did 
not include aircraft that are being phased out of the Navy and Marine inventory but that 
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have previously participated in HA/DR. These aircraft include CH-46s and certain variants 
of the Navy Seahawk such as the SH-60F. 
B. VERTICAL LIFT COST 
VAMOSC provided our research with a sortable report called the Aviation 
Type/Model/Series Report (ATMSR) that broke aviation costs into distinct cost elements. 
These elements are primarily unit-level manpower, unit operations, and maintenance. 
There are two additional cost categories, which are sustaining support and continuing 
system improvements. ATMSR also provides “count” reporting for total flight hours, 
barrels of fuel, and number of aircraft in the inventory. Our research utilized the unit 
operations cost exclusively for determining variable costs to flight operations in support of 
HA/DR. Utilizing database filters allowed us to filter unit operations into multiple sub-
elements, eventually isolating operations element 2.1.1.1 (energy), which reports the cost 
of aviation propulsion fuel purchased to support flight operations of Navy and Marine 
aircraft (VAMOSC, 2020). While this is a simplified way to determine aviation costs, it 
allowed us to better compare aviation platforms from a cost/capability analysis utilizing 
our linear programming model.  
To utilize a common metric in the linear programming model, we determined cost 
per flight hour for each aviation asset. This was accomplished by dividing total costs in 
terms of fuel used by the number of aircraft flight hours used in the reporting period. We 
narrowed our focus to Pacific Fleet, active duty, operational squadrons only, and cost 
calculations were limited to 2018 data only for recency. Figure 3 represents the derived 
data and is displayed in terms of cost/hour as a ratio. Analyzing the following data, we see 
that both the MV-22 and the CH-53 account for a greater cost per flight hour by 3.78 and 
3.63 times that of the UH-1, respectively. 
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Figure 3. Ratio of Cost per Flight Hour by Aircraft Type  
There are limitations to determining vertical lift costs. Herbert et al. (2012) captured 
HA/DR costs as well as the authorities and funding sources for HA/DR operations. Those 
authors further separated large cost components of HA/DR, such as flight operations, ship 
operations, and contracts, among others. They determined that the bulk of the costs 
associated with HA/DR to the DOD are aviation-related (Herbert et al., 2012). Cost 
determinations in their research were appropriate because they were trying to determine 
cost allocations to HA/DR for the purpose of reimbursement. 
In the design of our model, we sought to capture aviation costs from a variable cost 
standpoint (fuel only). The reason for this decision was to evaluate aircraft that are already 
deployed and being diverted to a disaster area for relief. We considered all other associated 
costs to be sunk. Manpower cost elements, for example, include not only the amount paid 
for billeted personnel within the squadron, but also allowances for temporary active duty 
members, retirement, bonus/incentive pay, etc. maintenance cost includes items such as 
consumable parts (bolts, nuts, wires) and repairable parts (starter motors, pumps), but it 
also includes cost elements such as depot-level maintenance facilities. Our research did not 
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VAMOSC. These costs would be incurred at various points throughout the year and do not 
represent the incremental variable costs attributable to HA/DR operations.  
C. VERTICAL LIFT CAPABILITIES 
We analyzed vertical lift capabilities by breaking them down into three parts: 
aircraft capacity, SAR capability, and relief radius. The aircraft data for these computations 
was provided by the Naval Air Technical Data and Engineering Services Command 
(NATEC) website and associated Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures 
Standardization (NATOPS) manuals for each airframe. When deciding which capabilities 
to evaluate, we looked at the most demanded capabilities (Apte & Yoho, 2018). We then 
compared those demands to ones that could be provided with vertical lift assets. Relief 
radius is discussed in more detail later, but it adds another dimension of distance or range 
to tether those capabilities. Figure 4 highlights the capabilities that vertical lift aircraft can 
achieve in response to natural disasters. The levels depicted are dimensionless in quantity 
and merely represent a potential demand signal for a given disaster scenario. The intent of 
Figure 4 is to overlap vertical capabilities with demand. 
 
Figure 4. HA/DR Demanded Capabilities. Adapted from Apte and Yoho 
(2018).1 
 
1 This figure was adapted from the source by adding capability overlays. 
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1. Vertical Lift Free Capacity 
We define capacity as the amount of supplies the aircraft can move, in pounds. 
There are several limitations to this capacity number, such as maximum gross weight of 
the aircraft, cubic displacement of the cargo, and trade-offs with fuel and crew weights. 
Additionally, aircraft gross weights can vary with environmental factors; for example, 
altitude, temperature, and humidity can affect engine performance and thus limit maximum 
gross weight (Naval Air Systems Command, 2019b). To control for the variability of 
environmental factors, we modeled each aircraft to the same environmental conditions 
when considering performance factors produced by applicable NATOPS manuals. Further, 
to accurately represent aircraft capacity, we developed a free aircraft capacity metric, 
which is the difference between maximum capacity and maximum fuel, in pounds. For 
example, the MH-60S helicopter has a maximum internal capacity of 5,500 lb and a 
maximum fuel capacity of 2,400 lb, accounting for fuel in the main tanks only (Naval Air 
Systems Command, 2019b). It would therefore have a free capacity of 3,100 lb in this case. 
Finally, there is an old aviation adage that states, “The only time you have too much fuel 
is when you’re on fire,” which is why we assumed that aircraft would never leave the hub 
without maximum fuel. Figure 5 represents a comparison of aircraft free capacity by type.  
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2. Search and Rescue 
The next most-frequently demanded capability to HA/DR as it relates to helicopters 
is the ability for aircraft to identify and recover stranded personnel. While all vertical lift 
platforms are capable of SAR operations, we identified the UH-1, MH60R, and MH60S 
aircraft to be the most capable and preferred platforms to perform this function. The H-53, 
for example, is not recommended to be a primary SAR platform due to its large size, which 
generates significant rotor downwash that can injure personnel below (Naval Air Systems 
Command, 2019a). Additionally, the larger required landing zone area of the V-22 and H-
53 make them less capable to effect ground recovery when significant amounts of debris 
are present or suitable landing zones are not available. It can be noted, however, that 
evacuation of large groups of personnel is better suited to the larger helicopters that are 
more accommodating in terms of size and seating configurations. Our research addresses 
the need for evacuation of people in extremis but does not include mass evacuations of 
people, as that would be better suited to transport aircraft. 
3. Relief Radius 
The range in which aircraft can travel, deliver supplies, and return to its hub is not 
infinite. Utilizing the performance data charts for level flight profiles available in the 
respective NATOPS publications, we modeled the selected performance databased on an 
operation from the sea, such as that launched from an amphibious-based platform, LHD, 
or aircraft carrier. To isolate environmental factors, the performance charts were selected 
to represent a common altitude and temperature. By analyzing these performance charts 
that indicate airspeed and fuel burn rate, our research determined what we refer to as a 
“relief radius,” depicted in Figure 6. The relief radius represents the maximum relative 
ranges an aircraft can safely travel to service a landing zone with supplies and return to the 
hub without the aircraft being in extremis in terms of remaining fuel. 
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Figure 6. Ratio of Relief Radius by Aircraft Type 
D. LINEAR PROGRAM MODELS 
Linear programs allow the efficient identification of an optimal solution of vertical 
lift aircraft given a set of constraints defined by a given scenario. We chose to analyze two 
linear programs to compare across two sets of optimal solutions. The first linear program 
consists of minimizing the cost of the optimal solution, subject to a minimum lift delivery 
requirement. The second linear program maximizes free lift capacity while subject to a 
budget constraint. Both linear programs and their parameters are outlined in the following 
section. 
Index and Set 
i = Type of Aircraft [1, 2, 3, …, 6] (1: MH-60S; 2: MH-60R; 3: CH-53E; 4: UH-1; 5: MV-
22 short range; 6: MV-22 long range) 
Input Data 
Ci = Cost of aircraft sortie ($US/sortie) 
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Ti = Available number of aircraft sorties2 
Si = Search and rescue (SAR) capability score3 
Li = Maximum usable free lift capacity (lbs) 
Mi = Aircraft limit capacity (lbs) 
Ji = Maximum aircraft fuel capacity (lbs) 
Fi = Cost per flight hour ($US/flight hr) 
Hi = Hours per sortie (hours/sortie) 
Ei = Sorties per day (sorties/day) 
Ri = Range capability score4 
D = Total capacity demand 
B = Total budget 
Calculated Parameter Data 
i i iL M J= −   (1) 
i i iC M J= −   (2) 
 *  i i iT A E=   (3) 
Decision Variables 
Xi = Number of aircraft sorties         
 
2 Upper bound of Ti is 80% of available Pacific Fleet aircraft as mandated by SECDEF (Mattis, 2018) 
3  = 0.75 if the aircraft can perform SAR (MH-60S, MH-60R, UH-1).  = -0.25 for all other 
aircraft. 
4 = 0.9 if the aircraft has long range capabilities (i.e., > 120 nautical miles; MV-22 long range). 
= -0.1 for all other aircraft.  
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≤∑   (7) 
1, 2,3,...,6i iX T i≤ ∀ =   (8) 
0iX ≥  and integer  (9) 
In Equation 1, the maximum usable lift capacity (Li) is calculated as the difference 
between the aircraft’s limit capacity (Mi) and fuel capacity (Ji). We assume that each 
aircraft operates with a full tank of fuel and can lift a cargo weight that equals the remaining 
limit capacity. Equation 2 explains the cost of an aircraft sortie (Ci) as the product of the 
aircraft’s cost per flight hour (Fi) and hours per sortie (Hi). Since the decision variables 
(Xi) are measured in sorties, the unit costs must likewise be measured per sortie. Fi is 
calculated through VAMOSC data based on fuel consumption per aircraft. Hi is 
independently determined by aircraft based on our scenario simulations.  
Objective Function 4 seeks to minimize the total cost of sortie operations in order 
to determine the optimal product mix of aircraft. This Objective Function is subject to 
Constraints 5−9 as a linear programming model. Constraint 5 represents the demand 
requirement. In other words, the optimal solution, measured in number of sorties, must 
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deliver at least the capacity, D. Constraint 6 accounts for the SAR capability requirements. 
Our linear program requires that at least 25% of the optimal mix be able to conduct SAR 
missions. As outlined in the Search and Rescue section of this paper, UH-1, MH60R, and 
MH60S are the only platforms that can conduct SAR. Constraint 6 is therefore derived as 
follows:  











  (10) 
 1 2 3 4 5 60.75  0.75 –  0.25  0.75 –  0.75 –  0.75 0X X X X X X+ ≥+ . (11) 
Inequalities 10 and 11 represent Constraint 6 with each aircraft’s assigned SAR 
capability score (Si) based on the operational requirements for SAR-capable aircraft. 
Similarly, Constraint 7 requires that at least 10% of the optimal mix posess long-range 
capabilities. This proportional requirement is accounted for by the range capability score 











  (12) 
 1 2 3 4 5 60.1 –  0.1 –  0.1 –  0.1 –  0.1  0.9 0X X X X X X− ≥+  (13) 
The constraints contained in Equation 8 limit the decision variables to the total 
number of available aircraft sorties (Ti) derived from the total available aircraft within the 
Pacific Fleet (Ai) and number of sorties feasible per day (Ei). Equation 9 requires the linear 
program to produce a non-negative, integer solution.  






























≤∑   (17) 
1, 2,3,....,6i iX A i≤ ∀ =   (18) 
0iX ≥  and integer  (19) 
The lift capacity maximization model utilizes the budget provided by the cost 
minimization model to determine the maximum amount of cargo that can be lifted in 
HA/DR support missions. The linear program for maximizing lift capacity largely shares 
the same parameters and constraints as the cost minimization linear program; the 
differences reside in Expressions 14 and 15. Objective Function 14 seeks to maximize the 
total lift capacity delivered by sorties. Constraint 15 bounds the solution within a total 
budget (B) for sortie missions. B is directly determined from the optimal value from 
objective function 4. Specifically, B equals the total cost determined in cost minimization 
objective function plus an additional 10% budget buffer. Constraints 16−19 are the same 
as the cost minimization model. 
E. MODELING RISK 
The parameters and constraints within our linear programs rely on our defined risk 
scenario, modeled after Operation Tomodachi, which outlines the operations of dispatched 
vertical lift assets. In particular, the scenario determines sortie duration (Hi) and number 
of sorties per day (Ei). In turn, our linear programs provide optimal mixes of vertical lift 
aircraft that are inputted and analyzed in our risk simulation model. Our risk simulations 
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allow us to analyze the lift delivery performance of vertical lift assets both individually as 
aircraft platforms and as a solution offered by the linear programs as previously stated in 
the Linear Program Models section of this paper.  
1. Explanation of Risk Model and Crystal Ball 
Our simulations consider vertical lift HA/DR operations as an iterative process 
dependent on the total flight time determined by landing zone locations. Figure 7 
demonstrates the iterative flow of an aircraft dispatched for HA/DR missions. The 
following subsections address the decision path of a single aircraft performing sorties. 
 
Figure 7. Iterative Decision Tree of Sortie Operations 
2. Assigned Landing Zone Distance and Decision Point 
The first step of a dispatched aircraft is to receive its LZ location and thus its 
distance to dispatched destination. Our simulation considers distance as a random variable 
following a uniform distribution with a minimum value of 10 NM and maximum value of 
120 NM. We assume that all U.S. vessels operate 10 NM from shore and extend 120 NM 
inland, and that each landing zone has an equal chance of residing anywhere within that 
range. In terms of flight time, our model assumes that each aircraft flies at a constant, 
aircraft-specific speed and under the same set of conditions. Calculating the total time of 
flight (hrs) involves a simple conversion of distance and airspeed equaling distance to LZ 
(NM) divided by the maximum range airspeed (NM/hr). 
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Once an aircraft receives its dispatch instructions, it must assess crew limitations, 
as we assume that each aircraft maintains the same pilots and crew for each mission day. 
The number of possible sorties is limited by crew fatigue regulations. Commander, Naval 
Air Forces (CNAF) Instruction M-3710.7 delineates maximum allowable time for pilots 
and aircrew to be in performance of their flight-related duties. Crew rest restriction states 
that pilots should be allowed 8 hours of uninterrupted rest in every 24-hour period (CNAF, 
2016). The maximum flight recommended for helicopter aircraft is 12 hours; however, at 
16 hours of continuous awake time, pilot performance begins to drop, and at 18 hours, 
pilots begin to experience a 25% performance drop (CNAF, 2016). It should be noted that 
these times do not include meals, aircrew briefings, preflight, or postflight operations. For 
this reason, our simulation and many commanders alike limit total pilot flight time to 
between 8 and 8.5 hours depending on the last sortie. For example, if the last sortie can be 
completed before the 8.5-hour total time mark, then it will execute, and if not, the pilots 
will not complete the sortie.  
3. Refueling, Loading, En Route, Unloading, and Return 
Once an aircraft decides to embark, it undergoes the parallel tasks of refueling and 
loading. We assume that time to accomplish both of these tasks is a constant 30 minutes 
across each type of aircraft. For the loading evolution, the amount of cargo loaded onto 
each aircraft sortie is a random variable. Using the Pearson-Tukey formula, we can derive 
the inputs to the lognormal distribution of mean and standard deviation utilizing a three-
point estimation of the following parameters: 95th percentile and median capacity per 
aircraft trip. It is important to note these parameters are approximations from subject matter 
experts within the aviation field because the actual data pertaining to each aircraft sortie is 
unknown. Table 1 represents the output data for the lognormal distribution used for 
determining the random variable “capacity” within our risk model.  
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Table 1. Lognormal Parameters by Aircraft Type 
Aircraft 
Type Mean (lbs) 
Standard 
Deviation (lbs) 
MH-60S 2,422.65 475.92 
MH-60R 1,172.65 230.77 
CH-53E 6,530.53 1,285.85 
UH-1 2,235.28 440.31 
MV-22 4,806.23 946.15 
 
Cargo load is considered a random variable because load capacity is restricted by 
volume, rather than by weight. In other words, the density of the cargo will vary from sortie 
to sortie, and thus the total lift capacity delivered. Upon arrival of the cargo at the LZ, we 
assume a constant unloading time of 30 minutes and a return flight time equal to its en 
route time. The distance that the aircraft will travel to deliver supplies is modeled by a 
uniform distribution out to the relief radius, and airspeeds are assumed to be maximum 
airspeed for each aircraft at maximum gross weight as determined by the respective 
NATOPS manuals. The one exception to these airspeeds is the V-22, which has been 
restricted to a maximum of 250 NM/hr to comply with airspeed limits within controlled 
airspace below 10,000 feet mean sea level in accordance with general operating and flight 
rules (Aeronautics and Space, 2020). 
F. DESCRIPTION OF RESULTS 
Using the optimal solutions provided in both linear programs, we input the 
conglomeration of aircraft into our risk independently to conduct Monte Carlo simulations. 
Each Monte Carlo simulation represents a single day of HA/DR operations and the total 
amount of lift delivered to LZs. The accumulation of all simulated lift quantities delivered 
by the independent aircraft forms a distribution for further analysis. We test the simulated 
distribution’s resemblance to the normal distribution according to the central limit theorem. 
In doing so, we determine whether the effect of an additional aircraft linearly increases the 
total free lift capacity delivered by all vertical lift aircraft. The accumulation of all lift 
delivery relies on two functions, each reliant on a single random variable. The first function 
is the total number of sorties flown by each aircraft with the input of distance assigned to 
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LZ dispatch as a random variable. The second is a random density function dependent on 
the weight of free cargo loaded onto each sortie by aircraft type. The total weight of cargo 
is aggregated by aircraft type and then indexed by the total number of sorties flown by each 
of those aircraft types. This index is repeated across Monte Carlo simulations to produce a 
distribution representing the estimated delivery quantity of one day of HA/DR operations.  
Additionally, based on the distribution, we can determine the reliability of lift 
delivery. In other words, the United States would be able to provide a 95% reliability of 
Navy and Marine Corps vertical lift aircraft delivered to HA/DR relief efforts. By 
providing these metrics, the United States can more efficiently use its vertical lift assets 
and better coordinate internationally for humanitarian assistance missions. 
27 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Our results include two main sets of metrics. First, we extract the optimal mixes 
from our cost minimization and capacity maximization linear programs. Second, we 
determine the median and 95% reliability capacities for the optimal mixes’ performance of 
one day of HA/DR delivery. The outputs of our research, therefore, jointly provide the 
ideal configuration of vertical lift assets for our 2011 Japan disaster scenario and reliability 
quantities for what the U.S. Navy can contribute to HA/DR missions.  
A. LINEAR PROGRAMMING ANALYSIS 
The results for both our daily cost minimization model and daily load maximization 
model consist of the total number of sorties and total number of aircraft required. The cost 
minimization model considers the historical account of the U.S. Navy’s tsunami relief for 
Japan to determine the total daily cargo required. Notably, the MH-60S and UH-1 aircraft 
are the most efficient and thus used exhaustively for the cost minimization and lift 
maximization models, respectively.  
1. Scenario Application for Cost Minimization Model 
For our cost minimization model, we determine the minimum amount of delivery 
for capacity demand required based on the U.S. Navy’s response to the tsunami-affected 
area. We estimate the total capacity demand required based on the historical number of 
persons displaced and in need of assistance when U.S. Navy and Marine Corps vertical lift 
assets could reach the disaster area. As a sudden-onset disaster, Japan in 2011 required as 
many vertical lift assets, and thus naval vessels to carry the assets, at the disaster scene as 
possible. As each vessel arrived to the scene, more accurate disaster data could be collected 
with regard to displaced and missing persons. We assume in our models total U.S. 
responsibility for all displaced persons to identify the maximum scope of the Navy and 
Marine Corps’ vertical lift support. However, we realize in a realistic scenario, the United 
States would cooperate with the other nations and non-governmental organizations for 
HA/DR.  
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All vertical lift–capable rotary aircraft were transported by U.S. Navy vessels to the 
tsunami relief region by March 19, 2011 (Aurelio et al., 2012). By this day, an estimated 
255,074 displaced persons needed assistance, as illustrated in Figure 8 (United States 
Agency for International Development [USAID], 2011a-r). Our linear program models 
assume this total estimation of displaced persons for the calculation of the total cargo 
delivery requirement. The USAID guidebook recommends that 7.8 lb of relief materials 
(water, food, medical supplies) be available for each displaced person each day (USAID, 
2005). The total daily cargo requirement for each day as the product of expected displaced 
persons and recommended daily cargo per person is 1,989,577 lb. Within our cost 
minimization model, we use 2 million pounds of total cargo as our constraint for total 
capacity demand, D.  
 
Figure 8. Total Displaced Persons by Date. Adapted from USAID (2011a–r). 
2. Daily Cost Minimization Model Results 
The results of our cost minimization model are outlined in Table 2. The first row 
denotes the total number of sorties required for one day of HA/DR support missions, 
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average number of sorties accomplished by each aircraft per day, based on the Monte Carlo 
simulations we ran. Dividing the number of sorties required by the average number of 
sorties per day yields in the third row the total number of aircraft required (rounded to the 
nearest whole number) for one mission day. This assortment of aircraft represents our 
optimal mix based on the cost minimization perspective. According to our model, the MH-
60S provides the most cost-efficient utility, as all 75 available aircraft are exhausted. The 
last row of Table 2 contains the daily cost of operating each sortie by aircraft. The optimal 
value, or total cost of one day of HA/DR operations under the cost minimization model, is 
$490,439.17. 
Table 2. Daily Cost Minimization Model Results 
 
 
3. Daily Lift Maximization Model Results 
The results of our daily lift maximization model are contained in Table 3. As with 
the daily cost minimization model, the first row contains the number of sorties required for 
one day of HA/DR operations, and the second row contains the average number of sorties 
accomplished by each aircraft per day, based on the Monte Carlo simulations we ran. The 
third row denotes the total number of aircraft required by type. Of special note, the daily 
lift maximization model elects to dispatch all 60 UH-1 aircraft available as the highest 
utility aircraft within the given budget constraint. The last row contains the 95th percentile 
weight limit for each aircraft. In other words, we assume for the purpose of our 
maximization model that each aircraft will carry up to the 95th percentile of its weight limit 
in cargo for each sortie dispatched. The total lift capacity delivered for one day of total 
sorties is 2,196,184.2 lb.  
MH60S CH53E UH-1 MV-22 Short MH-60R MV-22 Long Total
Number of Sorties 237 1 182 66 0 54 540
Number of Sorties/Day 3.16 2.9 3.2 4.94 3.01 2.06 -
Number of Aircraft 75 0 57 13 0 26 172
Daily Cost (Cost/Sortie) 622.15$     2,110.18$  541.25$     1,418.84$  666.67$     2,754.22$  490,439.17$    
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Table 3. Daily Lift Maximization Model Results 
 
 
B. RISK ANALYSIS 
We used Monte Carlo simulation to model risk analysis utilizing Crystal Ball. The 
simulation ran 100,000 trials, with each trial representing total capacity for one day in terms 
of pounds of goods delivered. The aircraft used are a result of the optimal vertical lift mix 
as previously determined by the linear programming model for both cost minimizing and 
capacity maximizing optimization. We evaluate the risk to capacity that can be delivered 
for both optimizations (cost and capacity) with a 95% certainty as well as the median 
capacity aggregated over all aircraft. These certainties are tailorable to the level of risk a 
commander may choose to incur for a given mission. We also present some of the error 
introduced while taking data from one aircraft, multiplying it by a determined factor, and 
running all aircraft individually. 
1. Risk Analysis (Cost Optimization Model)  
The cost optimization model utilized 75 MH-60S, 57 UH-1Y, and 39 V-22. Note 
that 26 of these V-22 were of the long-range type. Figure 9 represents the capacity of 
1,643,406 lb that can be delivered with a 95% certainty. In terms of capacity risk, this value 
represents our estimate of the minimum amount that can be delivered at least 95% of the 
time. Figure 10 is representative of median capacity of 1,678,337 lb, or the capacity that 
can be expected on an average day. 
MH60S CH53E UH-1 MV-22 Short MH-60R MV-22 Long Total
Number of Sorties 223 1 192 97 0 57 570
Number of Sorties/Day 3.16 2.9 3.2 4.94 3.01 2.06 -
Number of Aircraft 71 0 60 20 0 28 178
95th Percentile Capacity 3,100.0      8,357.0      2,861.6      6,150.0      1,500.0      6,150.0      2,196,184.2     
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Figure 9. Total Aircraft Daily Capacity with 95% Certainty 
 
Figure 10. Total Aircraft Daily Capacity with 50% Certainty 
2. Risk Analysis (Capacity Optimization Model) 
The capacity optimization model utilized 71 MH-60S, 60 UH-1Y, and 48 V-22. 
Note that 28 of these were of the long-range type. The risk simulation for this model took 
on a similar distribution, trending towards normal. Figure 11 represents the capacity 
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delivered with 95% certainty, 1,811,749 lb, and Figure 12 represents the average daily 
capacity of 1,848,115 lb, or a 50% certainty solution. Like the other risk model, the 
variance in the amount delivered, between 95% and the median, is minimal. 
 
Figure 11. Total Aircraft Daily Capacity with 95% Certainty 
 
Figure 12. Total Aircraft Daily Capacity with 50% Certainty 
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3. Evaluating Single Aircraft versus All Aircraft of the Same Type 
During our risk simulation, we had the decision of building the model for one 
aircraft and giving it a multiplication factor or building the model to analyze each aircraft 
individually. For example, the cost optimization model called for the employment of 57 
UH-1 helicopters. Figure 13 shows a portion of that run, only indicating three of the 57 
aircraft evaluated in total; however, among those three, we see a drastic difference in 
overall capacity for that day. Consider the difference between Aircraft 54 and Aircraft 55, 
where there is a 5,640 lb difference in goods delivered. If we then multiply these two results 
by a factor of 57, our daily capacity results vary drastically from 306,261 lb to 627,684 lb. 
The results of evaluating each aircraft independently and then summing the totals given by 
each aircraft resulted in an amount of 481,623 lb. The significance of this finding is that 
there is a large amount of volatility from one aircraft to another due to the variability in the 
distances to the LZs and the differences in capacity per sortie. Evaluating each aircraft 
individually produces a distribution that reduces this volatility. 
 
Figure 13. UH-1 Risk Simulation Model 
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Another finding is represented by the differences in the distributions created by 
evaluating one aircraft of a particular model over 100,000 trials and all aircraft of that same 
model over 100,000 trials. Figure 14 and Figure 15 visually depict these differences. In the 
single aircraft trial, the distribution appears to be multi-modal, whereas the distribution 
across all 57 UH-1 aircraft trends more towards a normal distribution.  
 
Figure 14. Distribution of a Single Aircraft  
 
Figure 15. Distribution of All Aircraft of a Single Type 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Our MBA project had two objectives. The first was to find an optimal mix of 
vertical lift aircraft that could be counted on to provide HA/DR, and the second was to find 
what is the likely daily capacity that can be counted on for that mix of aircraft. We 
developed two separate models to analyze these objectives. Given a situation where the 
number and type of aircraft are known, our models could accurately indicate which aircraft 
are most efficient in terms of both cost and capacity. Additionally, we could determine the 
risk to that capacity with a high degree of precision. Our models in this report provide 
results that are based on our assumptions of the number of aircraft we evaluated. As 
mentioned, they therefore provide scalability. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ANSWERED 
(1) What is the optimal allocation mix of U.S. Navy and USMC vertical lift 
capabilities in response to HA/DR operations? 
The optimal product mix depends on the mathematical model and what is being 
optimized. The cost optimization model where the objective function sought to minimize 
cost chose to dispatch all 75 available MH-60S aircraft because of the MH-60S’s higher 
relative cost efficiency compared to the other aircraft. The cost model then pulled 57 UH-
1 aircraft and 39 V-22s to satisfy the total capacity constraint or theoretical daily demand. 
The cost optimization configuration can deliver 1,643,406 lb daily with a 95% reliability 
and a median of 1,678,337 lb on an average day. By contrast, the capacity model chose to 
dispatch all 60 UH-1 aircraft first because of their higher relative capacity efficiency. The 
capacity model then utilized a mix of 71 MH-60S and 48 V-22 to satisfy the rest of the 
model. The optimal mix for the capacity maximization model can expect to deliver 
1,811,749 lb with 95% reliability and 1,848,115 lb on an average day. One important 
observation is that in both the models we utilized, the MH60R and the CH-53 aircraft were 
not part of the optimal mix. We interpret this conclusion to mean that both the CH-53 and 
the MH-60R, while capable, are relatively less efficient at HA/DR given our set of 
modeling constraints.  
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When we evaluated the risks to capacity being delivered from each aircraft, we 
found that the larger aircraft could reliably be counted on to deliver more goods in a given 
day than the smaller aircraft. For example, given a 95% certainty, a single V-22 could 
deliver 19,000 lb of goods, where a UH-1 could deliver 6,000 lb per day, representing a 
ratio greater than 3:1. When we compared the CH-53 and the V-22, which have a 
comparable load capacity, we found that the cruising speed of the V-22 gave an edge over 
the CH-53 because of the uniform distribution of the LZs.  
(2) What are the strengths and weaknesses of each type of vertical lift 
capabilities designated for HA/DR? 
Our Monte Carlo simulation modeled two different variables, distance to LZs and 
the capacity carried. We found that speed was probably the most important capability 
because of its relationship to time and distance, and it became increasingly more important 
the farther from the disaster area the LZs were. The V-22, because of its unique ability to 
fly as a fixed wing aircraft, allowed it to have the advantage of speed over all other assets. 
The second most important capability is related to the load capacity, or the ability to carry 
more resources on a single trip.  
Another important capability for HA/DR response is aircraft availability. It seems 
obvious, but dedicating more aircraft to a mission increases the level of HA/DR support. 
The most theoretical variable within our project was the number of aircraft we selected, 
which equated to the entire fleet of aircraft within the Pacific Fleet area of responsibility. 
We understood as researchers the impracticability of this assumption, but it was necessary 
given the amount of aid needed for many major disasters. The takeaway from this 
capability is that U.S. vertical lift assets alone are insufficient to respond to natural 
disasters. 
In the Risk Analysis section of this paper, we saw that variance to capacity 
delivered was small, equating to a 7% difference between 95% certainty and the median 
delivery capacity. From a decision-maker’s point of view, this variance is almost 
inconsequential in terms of risk; however, it is important to note that much of this variance, 
or lack thereof, has to do with the simplicity of the risk model itself. In reality, there is an 
infinite number of variables that could be incorporated into this model. For example, 
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loading, unloading, and fueling times, while held constant for our model, would also 
present some additional variability and thus create greater variance. Additionally, we are 
assuming perfect sortie completion (free of aircraft malfunction) and perfect LZ 
information, meaning isolated personnel are precisely in the location where the aircraft are 
landing. We mention these variables only to highlight that although our modeling variance 
is low, the potential variance, in reality would be much greater. 
B. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
1. Application of Models to Real-World Example 
The next step in our research project is to specifically adapt both our optimization 
and risk models to a real-world scenario modeled from a past disaster to capture a more 
realistic idea of aircraft mix and daily capacity. Often in the real world, commanders are 
not given the choice of what assets are available for employment to a disaster. However, 
there may be an event when the U.S. Navy can pre-select its vertical lift assets for HA/DR 
responses and desires to either minimize its costs or maximize its lift delivery performance. 
HA/DR coordinators can gather disaster-specific parameters, including the estimated 
distances to the LZ and relief demand based on the number of displaced persons. Using 
these parameters combined with the Navy’s parameters, including potential aircraft 
available and budget, the HA/DR coordinator can use our model to determine the optimal 
mix of vertical lift assets for the present disaster. Our risk analysis model inputted with the 
scenario-specific parameters and the amount and type of vertical lift assets employed 
would provide the HA/DR coordinator the projected reliability of cargo delivery. If this 
analysis can be used and subsequently communicated across international partners, each 
party can better plan how their assets will contribute to the overall relief demand. 
2. Other-Than-U.S. Assets  
In HA/DR, the U.S. Navy is one of many entities providing relief. Many other 
nations’ navies (including, in our scenario, the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force) 
significantly contribute to relief efforts. Resultantly, HA/DR consists of teamwork between 
all parties to communicate the location and number of displaced persons, assess the amount 
38 
of demand for all types of relief cargo, and track the completion of aid missions. Our 
research did not include the assets of other nations and non-governmental organizations in 
the delivery of goods and services (food, water, SAR). We assumed in our scenario that 
the U.S. Navy would be the sole entity providing relief for all displaced persons. 
Realistically, the U.S. Navy would not shoulder the entirety of operations. Analyses of 
other countries’ or organizations’ HA/DR assets could provide a better picture of the total 
capacity currently available.  
3. Multi-criteria Analysis 
Another potential area for research lies in evaluating trade-offs to force 
employment relative to each HA/DR response. Specifically, the cost/benefit to each 
additional asset for HA/DR support could more accurately evaluated. As decision-makers 
face the reality of finite resources, multi-criteria analysis will assist in efficient and 
effective resource allocation.  
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